Connecting Society and Policymakers? Conceptualizing and Measuring the Capacity of Civil Society Organizations to Act as Transmission Belts by Albareda, A.
ORIGINAL PAPER
Connecting Society and Policymakers? Conceptualizing
and Measuring the Capacity of Civil Society Organizations to Act
as Transmission Belts
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Abstract Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are consid-
ered important intermediaries between citizens and poli-
cymakers. They are assumed to function as transmission
belts that filter societal preferences and channel them to
policymakers. Although the ability of CSOs to connect
civil society with policymakers has been put into question,
it has rarely been theoretically specified and empirically
tested. This paper develops a conceptualization of CSOs
that examines their capacity to function as transmission
belts. It does so by distinguishing two organizational
dimensions related to member involvement and organiza-
tional capacity. The paper draws on a large survey of CSOs
active at the EU to empirically assess these organizational
dimensions and relate them to basic CSOs’ characteristics.
The findings indicate that one out of three organizations
approximates the ideal-type transmission belt. The findings
contribute to a better understanding and assessment of
CSO’s potential contribution to policy-making in repre-
sentative democracies.
Keywords Civil Society Organizations  Democracy 
Transmission belt  Member involvement  Organizational
capacity
Introduction
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are crucial intermedi-
ary organizations that connect citizens with policymakers
(Easton 1971; Putnam 1993; Rasmussen et al. 2014; Tru-
man 1951). By acting as transmission belts between the
preferences of civil society and the actions of policymak-
ers, CSOs can supplement the deficiencies of public insti-
tutions and contribute to a well-functioning democracy,
promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance
systems (Greenwood 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010). Yet, as
several studies have indicated, the representative function
of many CSOs is severely flawed (Binderkrantz 2009;
Halpin 2006; Jordan and Maloney 2007; Kohler-Koch
2010). And even when CSOs successfully involve their
membership base to ensure representativeness, they may
lack the organizational capacity that facilitates an effective
interaction with policymakers (Schmitter and Streeck
1999; van der Pijl and Sminia 2004).
The idea that CSOs function as transmission belts
denotes, although often implicitly, that they are able to
aggregate member preferences and efficiently transfer
these to policymakers. To date, and despite the burgeoning
literature on CSOs and interest groups in general, there is
little understanding of how well CSOs manage this bal-
ancing act. The main reason for this gap in the literature is
that scholarly work has usually emphasized just one of the
constituting elements of the transmission belt. Studies
focus either on membership involvement (Binderkrantz
2009; Jordan and Maloney 1998; Kohler-Koch 2010; Moe
1991), or on the organizational capacities developed to be
more professionalized (Klüver 2012; Klüver and Saurugger
2013; Maloney 2015; Skocpol 2003), but not on how CSOs
can and do manage the combination of these two aspects.
Furthermore, most studies use indirect variables and
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proxies to assess CSO membership involvement and
organizational capacity—the most frequent ones being
resources, organizational type (citizen vs. business groups),
scope of action (specialist vs. generalist organizations), and
organizational scale (individual organizations, national
associations, or supranational associations)—thereby
obscuring key organizational processes that facilitate the
connection between society and policymakers. We thus do
not have a clear understanding of how organizational
processes can contribute to a genuine transmission belt
function of CSOs, a function that is often assumed or
required by public institutions. This is problematic as it
results in limited knowledge of the role of CSOs in rep-
resentative democracies and hinders a good understanding
of how public institutions might involve them in a more
effective way.
This paper aims to fill this gap by unpacking the orga-
nizational structure of CSOs and examining how it relates
to fulfilling a transmission belt role. By focusing on the
internal structure of CSOs, the paper builds upon recent
work that has highlighted the importance of organizational
factors for connecting CSOs with their members and
transferring their demands to policymakers (Albareda and
Braun, forthcoming; Berkhout 2013; Binderkrantz 2009;
Braun 2013, 2015; Fraussen and Beyers 2016; Fraussen
et al. 2015; Halpin 2014; Halpin et al. 2018; Klüver 2012;
Minkoff et al. 2008; Muñoz Marquez 2016; Naoi and
Krauss 2009). Drawing on these studies in conjunction
with organizational theory, the paper conceptualizes the
transmission belt function by distinguishing two organi-
zational dimensions directly related to the two audiences
with whom CSOs mostly interact: members and policy-
makers (Ainsworth and Sened 1993). Importantly, involv-
ing members and having organizational capacity to be
politically active may lead to organizational tensions
(Maloney and Saurugger 2014; Schmitter and Streeck
1999; van der Pijl and Sminia 2004), hindering CSOs’
capacity to function as transmission belts. However, there
is limited evidence on whether this trade-off in fact exists.
This paper draws on a large survey of CSOs active at the
European Union (EU) level to test the occurrence of the
two organizational dimensions and, hence, the capacity of
CSOs to relay members’ preferences to policymakers
(Kohler-Koch 2010; Schmitter and Streeck 1999; van der
Pijl and Sminia 2004). In other words, this paper examines
CSOs by focusing on their organizational structure, which
reflects member involvement (i.e., internal democratic
structures) and organizational capacity (i.e., features aimed
at efficiently generating, processing, and transferring
information to policymakers). The focus on these organi-
zational dimensions enables us to assess how much orga-
nizational variety exists among CSOs and how many of
them are effectively organized as transmission belts. The
paper shows that one out of every three CSOs at the EU
level is effectively organized as a transmission belt as they
invest in structures to foster representativeness of their
members and, simultaneously, have the features that
facilitate an effective interaction with policymakers. Yet,
the majority of CSOs do not invest in both organizational
dimensions at the same time and, thus, do not have the
same potential contribution to a legitimate and effective
EU governance.
Unpacking the Transmission Belt: Dimensions
of Organizational Structure
Any organization has to design a formal structure to
effectively implement a strategy and reach their goals
(Chandler 1962). CSOs are no exception. Defined in its
broader sense, the term CSO includes organizations rep-
resenting social and economic players (e.g., trade unions,
employers’ federations, consumer organizations and non-
governmental organizations), organizations that bring
people together in a common cause (e.g., environmental
organizations and human rights groups), and organizations
pursuing member-oriented objectives (e.g., youth organi-
zations and family associations) (European Commission
2002, p. 6). As such, CSOs are complex entities that
require certain organizational structures to reach their
objectives. Thus, when CSOs are formed, the leadership
together with members and other key stakeholders needs to
respond to the inescapable question of ‘how should we
organize’ (Halpin 2014, p. 85). From a functionalist
approach, the organizational structure of CSOs is aimed at
solving collective action problems and achieving desired
outcomes for their membership base as effectively and
efficiently as possible (Williamson 1981). In this perspec-
tive, the main assumption is that the organizational struc-
ture ‘X’ is an instrument for achieving calculable and
predictable control of organizational performance, and
thus, it serves function ‘Y’ (Pierson 2000, p. 476).
Accordingly, the organizational structure of CSOs can be
conceived as a driver for the successful formulation and
implementation of strategies, and thus, for achieving
organizational goals (Greenwood and Miller 2010).
As intermediary organizations that relay constituents’
demands to policymakers, CSOs that intend to act as
transmission belts require organizational attributes that
enhance their ability to speak and interact with their two
main audiences: members and policymakers1 (Ainsworth
1 Policymakers are those public officials (elected or unelected)
responsible for formulating policies (Beyers and Braun 2014). Hence,
policymakers include actors ranging from governmental elites or top
politicians to lay civil servants. At the EU level, policymakers as
defined here are found in the three main EU institutions (Commission,
Parliament, and Council).
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and Sened 1993). In their seminal article, Schmitter and
Streeck (1999, p. 19) note that CSOs have to, on the one hand,
‘structure themselves and act so as to offer sufficient
incentives to their members to extract from them adequate
resources to ensure their survival, if not growth. On the other
hand, they must be organized in such a way as to offer suf-
ficient incentives to enable them to gain access to and
exercise adequate influence over public authorities.’ Hence,
CSOs aiming to operate as transmission belts have to ensure
that their work is well received by both their members and
policymakers (Jordan and Maloney 2007) and, conse-
quently, set up adequate organizational structures to fulfill
these objectives. Specifically, CSOs require organizational
features that facilitate the alignment of preferenceswith their
members (Kohler-Koch 2010), but also the structures that
enable them to efficiently generate, process, and transfer
valuable resources to policymakers. To examine the extent to
which CSOs are organized as transmission belts, the paper
builds upon an organizational configuration approach (cf.,
Miller 1996; Mintzberg 1979; Short et al. 2008). This
approach enables to depict common patterns across CSOs
and develop typologies of organizations that resemble each
other along the critical organizational dimensions identified
to accomplish the transmission belt function: member
involvement and organizational capacity.
Member Involvement
Members are the inner core of CSOs’ constituency. As such,
membership involvement is essential to derive legitimacy
for their advocacy and lobbying activities by claiming broad
representativeness (Johansson and Lee 2014, p. 405). When
policymakers seek to increase input legitimacy through
stakeholder involvement, representative CSOs are expected
to be better positioned to make their voice heard. Being
attentive to members’ preferences is also important for
maintenance and survival of organizations (Wilson 1995), in
particular for those whose budget highly relies on member-
ship fees. Moreover, involving the membership base, and
thus being responsive toward their demands, is a critical
internal element that shapes the identity of the organization
(Heaney 2004) and the issues prioritized in the policy agenda
of the organization (Halpin et al. 2018).
Despite these inducements to actively involve members,
previous work has demonstrated that CSOs engage with
members to different degrees and that organizations have
different representation strategies (Johansson and Lee
2014). Some CSOs are structured to actively involve their
members, gather their opinions and preferences, and act
accordingly. In contrast, other CSOs have a managerialist
discourse and work as professionalized oligarchies where
the senior staff has the autonomy and discretion to take
every relevant decision without consulting with a largely
passive membership base that is weakly involved in the
internal functioning of the organization (Jordan and Mal-
oney 2007; Maier and Meyer 2011).
There is a large variety of tools and methods to involve
members (e.g., consultation mechanisms, internal surveys,
plenary and ad hoc meetings, and involvement of members
in executive bodies and working groups); yet, as shown by
Johansson and Lee (2014), CSOs rely heavily on formal
structures to involve their members in the internal func-
tioning. In this vein, this paper conceptualizes member
involvement with three crucial formal elements that enable
CSOs to collect and aggregate members’ preferences and
become representative organizations; these are: the pro-
cesses set up to facilitate interaction among members and
CSOs representatives (Hayes 1986); the decision-making
system (Berry 1984); and the formal connections between
the organization and its local/regional constituency
(Skocpol 2003).
Firstly, providing a forum where members can interact
among themselves and with representatives of the CSO is
conceived as crucial to facilitate member involvement
(Hayes 1986; McFarland 2010, p. 55). As highlighted by
Jordan and Maloney (2007, p. 2), CSOs should ‘offer
opportunities for face interaction to enhance social inte-
gration and democracy itself.’ Besides, the interaction
among members is an occasion to develop quality rela-
tionships, foster the cohesion of the organization, and
promote a more homogenous message across members. As
specified by Albers et al. (2013), the relationship derived
from the interaction of members cultivates ties, supports
the development of trust in the organization, and
strengthens the flow of information among members and
between members and the organization.
Secondly, the decision-making system determines the
actual power of members to establish positions and
strategies (Albareda and Braun forthcoming; Berry 1984;
Binderkrantz 2009; Halpin and Fraussen 2017; Hollman
2017). CSOs can be subject to the preferences of their
members or, instead, may delegate the decision-making
power to the executive board, the leader of the organiza-
tion, or to senior staff. When decisions are taken by
members, it means that these actors have strong powers to
determine the avenues of the organization. Using Berry
et al.’s (1993) terms, decision-making systems are about
the depth of participation of members in a group. More
generally, engaging members in decision making is a way
to internalize conflict and, as a consequence, the likelihood
that members take individual steps to circumvent the
organization is reduced (Hollman 2017).
Finally, the organizational structures set to reach the
local constituency of the CSO ease the engagement of
members that are not based in the same location as the
headquarters of the organization and strengthen the societal
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embeddedness of the organization (Fraussen et al. 2015;
Skocpol 2003). Having local branches ensures that the long
chain of representation of multilayered CSOs is not broken
(Johansson and Lee 2014; Kohler-Koch 2012, p. 818). That
is, CSOs with local branches are expected to have closer
connections to the membership base and empower the
grassroots, thus facilitating the involvement of every
member. Making a parallel with the political party litera-
ture, local branches constitute the most tightly knit con-
nection between CSO representatives and their
constituency (Poguntke 2002, p. 9).
Organizational Capacity
Apart from involving their members, CSOs intending to
function as transmission belts also aim to gain access to
policymakers and shape public policy. Consequently, it is
necessary to assess the organizational capacity, that is, an
organization’s potential to achieve its mission and objec-
tives (Eisinger 2002). For a CSO that aims to operate as a
transmission belt, organizational capacity refers to those
organizational features that enable them to efficiently
generate, process, and transfer information from members
to policymakers (Daugbjerg et al. 2018; Schmitter and
Streeck 1999). More specifically, organizations need to go
beyond loose and network-type organizational arrange-
ments and become more formalized entities with auton-
omy, hierarchical structures, and certain levels of
specialization (Schmitter and Streeck 1999).
Recent studies have empirically shown that there is an
increasing trend toward the professionalization of CSOs
(Klüver and Saurugger 2013; Maloney 2015; Skocpol
2003). The conceptualization of organizational capacity
highly relies and speaks to the idea of professionalization,
in particular to having the expertise to generate technical
knowledge and centralized governance structures pursuing
a technocratic and scientific approach to organizational
maintenance and influence (Maloney 2015). However, in
contrast to the literature on professionalization (Klüver and
Saurugger 2013; Maloney 2015), this paper assumes that
organizational capacity is compatible with having active
membership, which is indispensable to attain the trans-
mission belt ideal.2
Importantly, not all CSOs have the organizational
attributes that are expected to foster organizational capac-
ity. Whereas organizations like Friends of the Earth or
Greenpeace have autonomous and centralized structures
and generate cutting-edge expertise, professional associa-
tions of lawyers or doctors are more focused on exchanging
information and on determining professional standards and
good practices. As can be inferred from the previous dis-
cussion, CSOs that want to increase their likelihood of
shaping public policy require three organizational elements
that determine their capacity to efficiently generate, pro-
cess, and transfer information to policymakers. These
organizational features are: autonomy (Verhoest et al.
2004), centralization (Christensen et al. 2016), and func-
tional differentiation (Pugh et al. 1968).
Autonomy is understood as the delegation of discre-
tionary authority to the secretariat, the office, or the senior
leadership of the organization (cf., King et al. 2010). An
autonomous CSO has the delegated power from its mem-
bers to act on their behalf. This paper focuses on de facto
and operational autonomy, which comprises the actual
decision-making competences of CSOs with regard to
specific subject matter (Bach 2014, p. 345). This type of
autonomy enhances managerial flexibility, contributes to
better services, and fosters organizational efficiency (Pollitt
et al. 2004). In this vein, autonomy enables the organiza-
tion to rapidly react to specific events or changing policy
environments and, subsequently, it is expected to increase
the efficiency in which CSOs process and transfer infor-
mation to policymakers.
Secondly, CSOs’ centralization is understood as the
hierarchical integration that serves as a mechanism to
coordinate the vertical and horizontal specialization of an
organization (Christensen et al. 2016). In centralized CSOs,
the apex of the organization (i.e., top representatives) has
significant formal and informal power to control the deci-
sions and activities of the organization. In contrast, in a
decentralized CSO, mid-managers in charge of depart-
ments or committees are expected to have considerable
leeway when taking and implementing decisions and to be
loosely connected among themselves and with the apex of
the organization (Damanpour 1991). Through centraliza-
tion, CSOs can minimize internal conflict, overcome ‘silo-
thinking’, feed the different units of the organization, and
produce valuable information that goes beyond particular
niches (Young 1992). Centralized CSOs not only ensure
unity of command and coordination, safeguarding a smooth
transmission of member preferences to policymakers, they
also favor the accumulation and exchange of information
and knowledge produced by the different units and bran-
ches of a CSO (Caimo and Lomi 2015).
Lastly, functional differentiation refers to the develop-
ment of organizational units or committees that deal with
concrete policy issues (Klüver 2012). It is defined as the
division of labor within an organization and the distribution
of official duties among several positions (Pugh et al. 1968:
2 Organizational capacity has also received significant attention in
the nonprofit literature. However, this literature is mostly interested in
those capacities that facilitate an effective provision/administration of
community services in different sectors (Eisinger, 2002; Fredericksen
& London, 2000; Misener & Doherty, 2009), and not so much on the
organizational attributes that endow CSOs with a higher capacity to
interact with policymakers.
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72–3). Organizational scholars also refer to this feature as
horizontal specialization or complexity, which measures
the number of different occupational specialties or spe-
cialized units at a given hierarchical level (Fioretti and
Bauke 2004). Functional differentiation might be under-
stood as an organizational element that processes the
preferences of members and produces specialized knowl-
edge that, ultimately, can be used to generate valuable
information for policymakers. In this vein, being func-
tionally differentiated is an organizational mechanism to
internalize interdependencies and generate research
capacity (Fraussen and Halpin 2017).
Transmission Belts: A Balancing Act Between
Member Involvement and Organizational Capacity
As discussed earlier, the combination of the two dimen-
sions (i.e., member involvement and organizational
capacity) is crucial for CSOs to forge a transmission belt
capacity. Ideally, a genuine transmission belt requires both
involving members and having organizational capacity,
and therefore CSOs need to have most of the items in each
of these two organizational dimensions. Yet, this is a
complex organizational endeavor and, as highlighted by
Kohler-Koch (2012, p. 815), it is not clear whether and
how CSOs ‘manage to reconcile the contradictory demands
of effective lobbying and boosting democratic participa-
tion.’ This twofold objective ‘puts substantial organiza-
tional demands on groups’ (Berkhout et al. 2017, p. 1126),
and, as noted by van der Pijl and Sminia (2004), may lead
to organizational dilemmas that CSOs need to solve (cf.,
Schmitter and Streeck 1999). That is, CSOs struggle to find
a balance between engaging their members in democratic
structures while being politically active in an efficient
manner.
Indeed, some of the objectives linked to the organiza-
tional items presented above might be difficult to combine.
At a general level, these two organizational dimensions
reflect two somewhat contradictory approaches: one bot-
tom–up—emphasizing the heterogeneity of members and
the need to represent every single voice within the orga-
nization—and the other one top–down—emphasizing
homogeneity and the need to control members (van der Pijl
and Sminia 2004). Fostering member involvement may
lead to the inclusion of different voices present in the
organization and strengthen its representativeness charac-
ter, but it is also linked to cumbersome consultations pro-
cesses that hamper the capacity of CSOs to efficiently
respond to policy demands in changing environments
(Hollman 2017). In contrast, centralized and autonomous
organizations tend to be more addressable (Rajwani et al.
2015); that is, they are able to speak with one single voice
in an efficient way. This may represent and advantage
when seeking access to policymakers pressured by time
and resources (Braun 2013; van Schendelen 2005), but it
also can damage the representativeness of the organization
and its capacity to provide input legitimacy to
policymakers.
Even though the combination of member involvement
and organizational capacity implies clear difficulties and
requires overcoming tensions and dilemmas (Jordan and
Maloney 2007; Klüver and Saurugger 2013), CSOs that
invest in both dimensions are organizationally prepared to
effectively relay citizens’ demands to policymakers.
Importantly, the constituting elements of each organiza-
tional dimension presented above are not mutually exclu-
sive. Thus, CSOs can actively involve their members in
democratic ways and have the structures that characterize
organizational capacity. In other words, some CSOs are
expected to be able to accommodate the two organizational
dimensions and, thus, approximate the transmission belt
ideal.
While this paper focuses on the structures that facilitate
information flow from members to the leadership of the
organization, it is also important to acknowledge that this
relationship might work in the opposite direction. That is,
the leadership of the organization may be able to shape
members’ attitudes and preferences (Berkhout 2013). This
is particularly true in the case of transmission belts because
they have the necessary capacity to influence their mem-
bership base through their own expertise and, at the same
time, they have the organizational attributes that facilitate
communication with members. In short, the relationship
between members and CSOs, particularly among trans-
mission belts, is expected to be bidirectional.
Research Design and Data
To empirically study the extent to which CSOs organize
themselves to function as a transmission belt, the paper
relies on data from the INTEREURO project, and more
specifically from the INTEREURO Interest Group Survey,
a tool designed to examine organizational characteristics
and policy activities performed by interest groups to
influence policy-making at the EU level. For the first time,
this survey generates large-n data on the internal func-
tioning of CSOs active at the EU level. The survey was
conducted from March 9 to July 2, 2015 and targeted senior
leadership of CSOs (Bernhagen et al. 2016). Initially, 2028
organizations were selected from the Transparency Regis-
ter of the EU, the OECKL Directory, and via elite inter-
views and media analyses (Beyers et al. 2016). The object
of study of the survey was European and national associ-
ations; therefore, firms and individual organizations were
excluded from the population. In total, 738 organizations
completed the questionnaire, reaching a response rate of
1220 Voluntas (2018) 29:1216–1232
123
36.2%. To test how the organizational dimensions con-
sidered apply to different types of CSOs, the sample
includes business as well as citizen CSOs and excludes all
the organizations that are not categorized in any of these
two groups as well as organizations without members.3
This reduces the sample to 500 organizations.
The focus on the CSOs mobilized at the EU level is
justified by institutional as well as organizational factors.
At the institutional level, CSO’s participation is considered
as an important way to ‘nurture EU’s weak democratic
legitimacy and contribute to more effective policy-making
by bringing the voice of civil society’ (Johansson and Lee
2014, p. 407). EU institutions actively reach out to orga-
nizations that link members with decision-makers and as
such contribute to the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU
governance (European Commission 2001, 2002; Kohler-
Koch 2010). In this vein, the role of CSOs is particularly
relevant at the EU level because they are expected to
mediate the representative distance between society and the
EU (Greenwood 2007). At the organizational level, CSOs
active in the EU are complex (multilayered) entities that
require certain organizational structure to involve their
members and engage with policymakers. The focus on
CSOs at the EU level has obvious implications in terms of
generalization that are discussed in the concluding section
of the paper.
Table 1 presents the operationalization of the six items
included to measure the two organizational dimensions.
These variables are based on different questions of the
INTEREURO Interest Groups Survey. Firstly, the presence
or absence of a general assembly or an annual meeting is
considered as crucial to enable the involvement of mem-
bers in the work of the organization (Jordan and Maloney
2007; McFarland 2010), and thus, this binary measure is
intended to measure the ‘Interaction’’ among members and
between members and CSOs’ leadership. Secondly, the
measurement of ‘Decision-making’ relies on two sub-items
of the questionnaire that are key for CSOs’ strategy,
namely how they make decisions when (1) establishing
their organization’s position on policy issues and (2)
deciding on advocacy/lobbying strategies and tactics
(Binderkrantz 2009). These two items have been grouped
based on the results of a principal component analysis
(PCA) and confirmed by an acceptable level of a Cron-
bach’s alpha test of reliability (a = .700) (Field 2009,
p. 675). This variable has been recoded as 1 when members
are involved in the decision-making process and 0 when
otherwise, thus, showing the formal decision-making
capacity of members to determine the fate of the organi-
zation (Johansson and Lee 2014). Thirdly, ‘Local chapters’
are based on a single question aimed at identifying whether
Table 1 Measuring transmission belts: member involvement and organizational capacity
Item Operationalization
Member involvement
Interaction 0 = Organizations do not have a general assembly or an annual general meeting
1 = Organizations have a general assembly or an annual general meeting
Decision making 0 = Members do not participate in the decision-making processes when establishing positions and defining strategies
1 = Members participate in the decision-making processes when establishing positions and defining strategies
Local chapters 0 = Organizations do not have local or regional chapters
1 = Organizations have local or regional chapters
Organizational capacity
Autonomy 0 = The senior staff of the organization does not have decision-making power on the budget or on hiring staff
1 = The senior staff of the organization has decision-making power on the budget and on hiring staff
Centralization 0 = The apex of the organizations is not influential when establishing positions and defining strategies
1 = The apex of the organization is influential when establishing positions and defining strategies
Functional
differentiation
0 = The organization does not have committees for specific tasks
1 = The organization has committees for specific tasks
3 To be precise, business groups correspond to the following survey
category ‘‘Trade, business & professional associations,’’ and citizen
groups refer to ‘‘non-governmental organizations, platforms and
networks and similar.’’ The following categories have been excluded
from the sample due to the low number of respondents representing
these types of groups (in total, they represent 70 organizations):
‘‘organizations representing churches and religious communities’’
(n = 11), ‘‘other public or mixed entities, etc.’’ (n = 16), ‘‘other
similar organizations to ’public or mixed entities’’’ (n = 12), ‘‘local,
regional and municipal authorities (at sub-national level)’’ (n = 17),
and ‘‘trade unions’’ (n = 14). Additionally, 128 respondents did not
specify the type of group of their organization and, therefore, have
been removed from the sample. Lastly, 40 organizations indicated
that they did not have members and, thus, have been excluded from
the sample.
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the organization has local or regional branches (Fraussen
et al. 2015).
Regarding the second dimension on organizational
capacity, ‘Autonomy’ reflects whether the senior staff of
the organization has decision-making competences on
budgetary issues and hiring staff. By focusing on opera-
tional autonomy, which indicates the capacity of the group
to take human resource management decisions by itself,
this variable is conceived as a powerful indicator of the
‘degree of [member] interference in the day-to-day man-
agement of the [group]’ (Bach 2014, 345). Results have
been recoded as 1 when the senior staff can decide on both
issues and 0 when otherwise. ‘Centralization’ is a construct
that captures whether the apex of the CSO (i.e., executive
director, the chair of the board, and the board of directors)
is somewhat or very influential when (1) establishing EU
positions and (2) deciding on advocacy and lobbying tac-
tics. Thus, this operationalization reflects the effective
concentration of power/influence on the apex of the orga-
nization (Albers et al. 2013; Damanpour 1991), or in Pugh
et al.’s (1963) terms, the real authority of CSOs’ apex. The
variable relies on six items that have been grouped after
examining the data with a PCA and estimating the relia-
bility of the construct (a = .786). Finally, ‘Functional dif-
ferentiation’ reflects whether CSOs have committees for
specific tasks or not (Klüver 2012, p. 496). ‘Appendix 1’
presents the complete list of questions used to construct the
two dimensions, and Table 4 in ‘Appendix 2’ includes a
correlation matrix among the main variables.4
To further explore variation in the organizational forms
resulting from the cluster analysis, the paper considers five
basic characteristics of CSOs: type of CSO, age, resources,
organizational scale, and membership diversity. Type of
CSO distinguishes whether the organization is composed of
business organizations (i.e., trade, business, and profes-
sional associations) or if, instead, gathers citizen organi-
zations (i.e., non-governmental organizations, platforms,
and networks and similar). Organization age indicates how
old the CSO is. Resources are measured via the equivalent
employees working full time in the organizations.
Organizational scale indicates whether CSOs are national
or a supranational association. Lastly, we include mem-
bership diversity, which captures how many different types
of members has each CSO, the options being: individual
members, firms, local and regional governments, national
associations, and European associations (see Table 5 in
‘Appendix 2’ for descriptive statistics and correlations
among variables).
Analysis
The analyses proceed in two steps. Firstly, the paper pre-
sents the results of cluster analysis to, subsequently,
examines how the resulting clusters relate to basic char-
acteristics of CSOs presented in the previous section.
A cluster analysis is conducted to examine how the
constructs of member involvement and organizational
capacity are distributed across CSOs. This approach offers
a description of organizations by identifying organizational
forms of CSOs that resemble each other along the two
dimensions identified (Short et al. 2008, p. 1054). Hence,
cluster analysis fits the purposes of the paper, namely to
assess the extent to which the organizational structure of
CSOs conforms to the ideal-type transmission belt and to
reveal possible variations. The cluster analysis gathers
CSOs into categories such that organizations in the same
cluster are more alike to each other than to other clusters
(Hair et al. 2008). More specifically, the chosen analysis is
Ward’s method, a type of hierarchical clustering aimed at
joining cases into clusters such that the variance within a
cluster is minimized (Szekely and Rizzo 2005). This
agglomerative method is appropriate when no outliers are
present and when equally sized clusters are expected (Mooi
and Sarstedt 2011).5 The number of clusters considered is
based on the interpretation of the Ward’s linkage cluster
dendrogram (see Fig. 1 in ‘Appendix 2’). To cross-validate
this result, the same analysis has been conducted with ten
subsamples (Gordon 1998). The resulting clusters of the
subsamples have been compared to the ones obtained in the
complete sample. In every case, the results of the Chi-
square tests comparing the clusters of the whole sample
with the ones of the subsamples are significant, confirming
the validity of the findings.
4 Table AI in Appendix II presents a correlation matrix of the six
variables used to develop the two dimensions. All the correlation
coefficients (excluding the ones between the dimensions and the items
they are based on) are below .400, ensuring that these are independent
variables measuring distinct elements of the organizational structure
of CSOs. Additionally, the independence of the variables has been
further investigated to ensure that none of the features is a
precondition to have a ‘second’ item. For instance, it could be argued
that CSOs need ‘Interaction’ to actually involve members in
‘Decision-making.’ However, a close analysis shows that 34.29% of
CSO without ‘Interaction’ actually involve members in decision-
making. In this vein, strategic decision making by all the members
may be done through non-plenary or face-to-face meetings but via ad
hoc or virtual meetings, or even via e-mails or one-to-one consul-
tations between the organization and its members.
5 The expectation of equally sized clusters is based on the results of
previous works that find substantial variation of categories of CSOs
when considering organizational elements (Baroni et al. 2014;
Minkoff et al., 2008). Because the two dimensions are equally
important to function as a transmission belt, there is no need to weight
them, nor to control by which one is more relevant when determining
the final clusters. Furthermore, since both dimensions have the same
scale, there is no need to standardize the data to prevent a variable
with high variability from dominating the cluster analysis.
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Table 2 presents the main results of the cluster analysis
(see also Fig. 2 in ‘Appendix 2’). The cluster analysis gen-
erates four different combinations of the two dimensions.
That is, based on the presence of the organizational features
associated with involving members and having organiza-
tional capacity, the analysis discerns four different ways in
which CSOs organize.6 This finding is aligned with previous
studies that highlighted organizational diversity among
CSOs, even within citizen or business CSOs (Baroni et al.
2014; Minkoff et al. 2008). More specifically, the results
show a similar pattern to what Minkoff et al. (2008) found in
the US context: There is substantial variation in the organi-
zational structures of CSOs active at the EU level. This
variation is very relevant considering the institutional pres-
sure (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) at the EU level for orga-
nizations that function as transmission belts (European
Commission 2001, 2002), or that are professionalized
(Klüver and Saurugger 2013; Maloney 2015). Despite these
isomorphic forces, CSOs seem to have some degree of dis-
cretion to develop the organizational structure that they
believe is more appropriate for their own purposes, and not
the one that is mostly demanded from public institutions.
Out of the 268 observations7 included in the analysis, 44
CSOs (16.42%) have an organizational structure that score
low in both member involvement and organizational
capacity. Consequently, organizations in this cluster are
labeled as Passive. More specifically, CSOs in this cluster
have a poorly developed organizational structure and can
be considered as loose and weakly connected networks that
invest few resources to engage with their own members or
have organizational capacity.
The second cluster (i.e., named as Representative)
gathers 39 CSOs (14.55%) that possess organizational
features that foster member involvement, yet do not have
the characteristics that are considered indicative of the
capacity to generate, process, and transfer members’ pref-
erences and information to policymakers. Hence, Repre-
sentative organizations are mainly oriented toward their
membership base, promoting participation and fostering
the internal cohesion. These organizations are more akin to
what Schmitter and Streeck termed clubs or forums, with
organizational structures that facilitate interaction among
members, participation in collective activities, exchange of
information and expertise, and formation of a collective
identity (Schmitter and Streeck 1999). The existence of
such a cluster demonstrates that despite the current debate
about the democratic flaws of organized interests (Halpin
2010; Jordan and Maloney 2007), there are still some
organizations that have the necessary organizational fea-
tures to be internally democratic. Yet, the low percentage
of Representative CSOs is surprising considering the EU’s
explicit request for representative CSOs that are connected
with their members (Kohler-Koch 2010).
The third cluster gathers 98 CSOs (36.57%) with those
organizational features that are expected to foster their
Table 2 Comparison of cluster characteristics (see footnote 6)
Mean (S.D.) Passive Representative Capable Balanced Total
Member involvement 1 (.431)* 2.36 (.486)* 1 (0) 1.966 (.283)* 1.511 (.633)
Interaction .841 (370)* 1 (0) .969 (.173) 1 (0) .963 (.190)
Decision making .091 (.291)* .692 (.468)* .031 (.173)* .609 (.491)* .325 (.469)
Local chapters .068 (.255)* .667 (.477)* 0 (0) .356 (.481)* .224 (.418)
Capacity .750 (.438)* 1.282 (.456)* 2 (0) 2.103 (.306)* 1.724 (.592)
Autonomy .023 (.151)* 0 (0) .041 (.199) .149 (.359)* .067 (.251)
Centralization .454 (.504)* .718 (.456)* 1 (0) .977 (.151)* .862 (.346)
Functional differentiation .272 (.451)* .564 (.502)* .959 (.199)* .977 (.151)* .795 (.405)
Total % (n) 16.42 (44) 14.55 (39) 36.57 (98) 32.46 (87) 100 (268)
P values () indicate significance for a test of equality of a variable’s distribution among the four clusters; analysis of variance for continuous
variables and Pearson Chi-square for categorical variables
P values (*) indicate significance for a test of equality of a variable’s distribution within a cluster versus the variable’s overall distribution;
t statistics for continuous variables and Pearson Chi-square for categorical variables
*, p\ .05
6 To further validate the results, a discriminant analysis of the
identified clusters and the two dimensions included in the clustering
process has been conducted. Results indicate that 96.64% of the CSOs
were correctly classified by the discriminant analysis. If the cases are
classified manually in a two-by-two matrix where ranking 0 and 1 is
considered as low and 2 and 3 is regarded as high, then we see that
93.1% of the cases fall into the same categories.
7 Missing data are mainly explained by non-responses to the
questions used to construct the variable ‘‘Centralization.’’ This
variable has 38% of missing responses (n = 223). A t test analysis
for each variable has been conducted to assess non-response bias of
Footnote 7 continued
the main variables. Results are not significant for any of the two
organizational dimensions.
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capacity to effectively generate, process, and transfer
information to policymakers. However, as the structure
to engage with members and supporters of most of the
organizations in this cluster is underdeveloped, they have
been labeled as Capable organizations. This finding is
aligned with Halpin’s (2006) observation that not all
CSOs seek representation. Additionally, it speaks to the
trend toward professionalization that has been identified
at the EU level (Jordan and Maloney 2007; Klüver and
Saurugger 2013; Maloney 2015). As noted by Van Deth
and Maloney (2012), there is a gradual change in which
organizations become more specialized and centralized
and give less priority to organizational democracy. In
this regard, organizations in this cluster are expected to
be more strongly focused on policy advocacy and on the
provision of expertise to policymakers. A paradigmatic
example of an organization clustered as ‘Capable’ is
Friends of the Earth Europe, an organization that, as
Rootes (2009, pp. 210–211) noted, was not ‘established
to be responsive or accountable to members. Instead,
they were founded to be ‘uninhibited campaigning’
groups and campaign effectiveness was privileged over
democratic involvement.’ Intriguingly, results indicate
that there are twice as many Capable groups as Repre-
sentative ones. As noted, this is surprising if we consider
the rhetoric of the Commission and its preference for
representative groups that favor democratic participation
(European Commission 2001, 2002); yet, the dominance
of Capable over Representative groups is aligned with
recent research assessing the representational capacity
and the policy engagement of interest groups at the EU
level (Berkhout et al. 2017).
Finally, 87 organizations (32.46%) closely approximate
the transmission belt ideal, with a high potential to link
members’ preferences to policymakers (Berkhout et al.
2017; Braun 2015). More specifically, these CSOs are able
to effectively represent their members thanks to democratic
structures, and transform the preferences of their members
and other organizational resources into relevant access
goods for policymakers. Because of their ability to inte-
grate both dimensions, organizations in this cluster have
been labeled as Balanced. CSOs in this cluster meet the
demands of the Commission for representative organiza-
tions that effectively functions as intermediaries of the
public, enhancing input and output legitimacy of EU
institutions (European Commission 2001; Greenwood
2007; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2013). Additionally, the
existence of this cluster demonstrates that the tensions and
dilemmas associated with having both organizational
dimensions are not insurmountable. That is, even though
involving members and having organizational capacity are
not easy or cheap (Jordan and Maloney 2007), an important
number of CSOs successfully combine both organizational
dimensions.8
To further explore these results, this second part of the
section examines the relationship between the four clusters
and five basic variables of CSOs: type of organization (i.e.,
citizens vs. businesses), organizational age, resources,
organizational scale, and membership diversity. Results in
Table 3 do not present a clear linkage between CSO
characteristics and the four clusters. That is, none of the
five characteristics is related to the four organizational
forms resulting from the cluster analysis. Yet, there are
significant relationships in Table 3 that are worth dis-
cussing. Firstly, being Representative, Capable or Balanced
is not significantly related to whether the CSO gathers
citizen or business organizations. With the only exception
of Passive organizations which are significantly associated
with citizen groups, the results demonstrate that the dis-
tinction between business and citizen groups, and the
assumptions linked to each of them, does not hold when
considering the organizational form of CSOs (cf., Hollman
2017). More specifically, our findings suggest that business
and citizen groups are equally capable of functioning as
transmission belts (cf., Flöthe and Rasmussen 2018), which
contradicts previous investigations that find significant
relationship between being a business group and acting as
transmission belt (Berkhout et al. 2017). More generally,
this result reinforces the applicability of this conceptual-
ization across any type of CSOs, regardless of whether they
are business or citizen organizations. Secondly, the cluster
labeled as Passive gathers the youngest organizations.
From an organizational perspective, Passive CSOs may be
evolving toward one of the three typologies that are
regarded as legitimate in the EU environment (Hannan and
Freeman 1977). However, an alternative explanation could
be that these younger organizations use new, less-formal-
ized, or untraditional mechanisms to communicate with
their members and policymakers (cf., Fraussen and Halpin
2018). Regarding the amount of resources, it is only sig-
nificantly and positively related to Representative organi-
zations; that is, CSOs that actively involve their members
8 The internal validity of the results of the cluster analysis is analyzed
by testing the differences between the clusters and the variables used
to obtain the clusters. The test of equality of the variable’s distribution
among the four clusters shows that the two dimensions, as well as the
six variables used to construct them, vary significantly across the four
resulting clusters. Moreover, the test of equality of a variable’s
distribution within a cluster versus the variable’s overall distribution
indicates that all the variables within clusters differ significantly from
the same variables in the other clusters. The only nonsignificant
results are those variables with integer values and no standard
variation. Furthermore, the variables ‘‘Interaction’’ for Representative
and Capable organizations and ‘‘Autonomy’’ for Representative
organizations also have nonsignificant distributions when compared
with the overall distribution.
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require more resources in terms of staff. Intriguingly, the
distinction between national and supranational CSOs does
not matter for explaining their organizational form. Finally,
membership diversity (i.e., whether the organizations
gather more or less heterogeneous members) is signifi-
cantly related to Capable and Balanced organizations, but
in opposite ways. Whereas more heterogeneous CSOs tend
to organize themselves as Capable organizations that
hardly involve their members, homogenous CSOs tend to
be organized as Balanced organizations. CSOs with higher
levels of membership diversity have lower chances of
investing in democratic structures, but do invest in orga-
nizational capacity. That is, CSOs with a heterogeneous
membership base emphasize a top–down perspective to
control their members (van der Pijl and Sminia 2004;
Williamson 1981). In contrast, the more homogenous the
CSO, the higher the likelihood that it can be organized as a
transmission belt (Berkhout 2013; Kröger 2018). That is,
having the same type of members facilitates the develop-
ment of organizational structures aimed at involving
members and at having the necessary organizational
structures to generate, process, and transfer information to
policymakers.
Conclusion
The capacity of CSOs to act as transmission belts is crucial
to their contribution to policy processes and democracy.
This paper theoretically develops and empirically assesses
the organizational ability of CSOs to function as trans-
mission belts that connect members’ preferences with
policymakers. As clarified in the Introduction, the literature
either considers only one side of the transmission belt coin
(by focusing on engagement with members or on having
organizational capacity) or refers to organizational form in
very general terms (e.g., by using organizational type as
proxy for certain organizational feature and practices). To
move the literature forward and increase our understanding
of the role of CSOs in policy-making, this paper theoreti-
cally unpacks the transmission belt notion based on the
distinction of two organizational dimensions: member
involvement and organizational capacity. The paper offers
a fine-grained conceptualization of the constituting ele-
ments of these organizational dimensions and unites them
in a new theoretical framework of organizational form to
assess the capacity of CSOs to function as transmission
belts. This tool can be understood as a foundation to go
beyond traditional proxies and to better theorize on the role
of CSOs in representative democracies. In this vein, the
empirical examination of this conceptualization indicates
that 32% of EU CSOs approximate the ideal-type trans-
mission belt, as they have a balanced organizational
structure with elements aimed at both involving members
and having organizational capacity. This suggests that at
least some CSOs indeed are able to manage the tensions
related to the challenge of both listening to members and
talking to policymakers. Yet, we also observe important
variation concerning the organizational form, as the
majority of the CSOs do not have the organizational fea-
tures associated with both processes. While almost 50% of
the organizations prioritize either member involvement or
organizational capacity, 16% invest very little in both
organizational dimensions. Hence, despite the rhetoric of
the Commission and its preference for CSOs that function
as transmission belts, there is significant variation in how
CSOs are organized, which results in unequal capacities to
function as a transmission belt.
It is worth to acknowledge a potential source of bias
related to the research design and the EU-centered sample.
Table 3 Logistic regressions by cluster
Passive Representative Capable Balanced
CSO type: citizens REF REF REF REF
CSO type: businesses .514* (.190) 1.017 (.404) 1.548 (.438) .953 (.274)
Organizational age .983* (.010) 1.001 (.008) 1.004 (.006) 1.003 (.006)
Resources (FTE) .998 (.005) 1.012** (.005) .995 (.004) .991 (.007)
Organizational scale: National CSOs REF REF REF REF
Organizational scale: Supranational CSOs .528 (.247) 1.527 (.899) .858 (.328) 1.394 (.586)
Membership diversity .908 (.134) .999 (.154) 1.274** (.141) .796* (.098)
N 248 248 248 248
Constant .877 (.550) .088*** (.068) .295** (.151) .587 (.324)
Log likelihood - 103.085 - 95.256 - 159.849 - 152.443
Pseudo R square .05 .06 .03 .03
Odds ratio, standard error in parenthesis
*p\ .1; **p\ .05; ***p\ .01
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A particularity of CSOs operating at the EU level is that
they are encouraged by EU institutions to function as a
transmission belt, which, from an institutionalist perspec-
tive, may lead to higher incidence of this type of organi-
zations (cf., DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yet, they also
face a larger distance between elementary membership
units and the decision-making center, which places higher
organizational demands to connect members to policy-
makers. Therefore, the distribution of the different
typologies of CSOs identified may vary across institutional
settings that place different institutional and organizational
pressures on CSOs organizational structure (cf., Berkhout
et al. 2017). Consequently, future comparative research
could examine the relationship between systems of interest
intermediation and the presence of CSOs operating as
transmission belts. Besides, this paper has analyzed how
CSOs are organized by using reported survey data that tap
into key organizational elements of each dimension. Future
research might build upon this conceptualization by con-
ducting in-depth qualitative investigations to further
examine the validity of the measurement and operational-
ization of the variables that compose each organizational
dimension and to gain more insight on how transmission
belts are organized. Lastly, this paper builds upon a func-
tionalist approach to conceptualize CSOs organizational
structure. Yet, as has been already noted, the data available
do not allow us to know whether CSOs are deliberatively
organized as they are or if instead, and despite their will-
ingness to be organized in a certain way, they fail to set up
the necessary organizational features to achieve their goals.
In addition, some CSOs may have concrete organizational
structures not because they serve a concrete function, but
because they are the most accepted and legitimate in the
EU institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell
1983). This could explain the limited explanatory power of
the main features included in the analysis of Table 3 and
the higher frequency of Balanced and Capable CSOs at the
EU level—which are the forms that are more frequently
demanded by EU institutions (European Commission 2001,
2002; Klüver and Saurugger 2013; Maloney 2015). In that
regard, future research could combine functionalist and
institutionalist approaches to assess the extent to which the
organizational form of CSOs rationally serves certain
functions and responds to institutional and isomorphic
forces (cf., Pierson 2000).
Returning to the role of CSOs in policy-making and
democracy, the results obtained suggest that approximately
one-third of CSOs operating at the EU level can contribute
to the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU governance by
connecting members and supporters with decision-makers
(European Commission 2001, 2002). In contrast to
Balanced organizations, the contribution of Representative
and Capable organizations to EU governance can be
questioned, or at least seems of a different nature. On the
one hand, Representative organizations are relevant to
foster input legitimacy and compliance with common goals
because of their engagement and strong connection with
members. On the other hand, Capable organizations can
contribute to EU effectiveness due to their organizational
capacity to be politically active. More specifically, Capable
organizations can mostly contribute to EU governance with
output legitimacy as well as expertise. Consequently, only
a minority of CSOs are organizationally prepared to
account as surrogates for the democratic deficit of the EU
by fostering democratic participation and, in particular, the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the policy process. That is,
only Balanced organizations are organizationally prepared
to contribute to different types of legitimacies and resour-
ces that are highly valued by EU institutions. In that regard,
future research may also look into whether CSOs that
effectively involve members and have organizational
capacity are, in fact, more relevant among policymakers
and thus contribute to more legitimate and effective gov-
ernance systems.
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Appendix 1: Selected Questions
of the INTEREURO Interest Group Survey
Member Involvement
1. Interaction
Does your organization have any of the following?
Please tick all boxes that apply.
A general assembly or an annual general meeting 
2. Decision making:
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Organizations like yours can make decisions in different
ways, such as consensus among individual members or
board members or by voting procedures. Can you please
indicate below how your organization primarily makes
decisions in the following areas?
3. Local chapters:
Does your organization have any of the following?
Please tick all boxes that apply.
Local or regional chapters  
Organizational Capacity
1. Autonomy
Organizations like yours can make decisions in different
ways, such as consensus among individual members or
board members or by voting procedures. Can you please
indicate below how your organization primarily makes













































Thinking about your organization’s position on EU







Not at all 
influential
Executive director
Chair of the board
The board of 
directors/executive 
committee
Thinking about your organization’s decisions on advo-
cacy and lobbying tactics, how would you rate the relative






Not at all 
influential
Executive director
Chair of the board
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Does your organization have any of the following?
Please tick all boxes that apply.
Committees for specific tasks 
Appendix 2
See Figs. 1, 2 and Tables 4, 5.
Fig. 1 Dendrogram for Ward’s linkage cluster analysis
Passive Representative Capable Balanced
Fig. 2 Scatter plot of CSOs by cluster (weighted by %)
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